Truthful auction for cooperative communications

Abstract

On one hand, cooperative communication has been gaining more and more popularity since it has great potential to increase the capacity of wireless networks. On the other hand, the applications of cooperative communication technology are rarely seen in reality, even in some scenarios where the demands for bandwidth-hungry applications have pushed the system designers to develop innovative network solutions. A main obstacle lying between the potential capability of channel capacity improvement and the wide adoption of cooperative communication is the lack of incentives for the participating wireless nodes to serve as relay nodes. Hence, in this paper, we design TASC, an auction scheme for the cooperative communications, where wireless node can trade relay services. TASC makes an important contribution of maintaining truthfulness while fulfilling other design objectives. We show analytically that TASC is truthful and has polynomial time complexity. Extensive experiments show that TASC can achieve multiple economic properties without significant performance degradation compared with pure relay assignment algorithms.