Financial Management · 1999 · 212 citations · 13 references
ManagementCorporate GovernanceFinanceAgency TheoryCorporate FinanceExecutive CompensationBoard CompositionCommittee StructureEquity CompensationOwnership StructurePay-for-performance CompensationPerformance-based CompensationCeo Equity CompensationCeo OversightCompensation Committee DesignCompensation Committee EffectivenessCompensation Committee PerformanceCorporate Performance MeasurementExecutive Compensation DecisionsExecutive Compensation Effects
CEOs receive preferential treatment, at the expense of shareholders, when corporate insiders are included on the compensation committee. While CEO compensation is not greater, the relation between CEO compensation and corporate performance is more favorable to the CEO with insiders on the compensation committee when corporate performance is poor.
13
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Michael S. Weisbach · Journal of Financial Economics · 1988 · 4.4K citations
Management, Corporate Governance, Organizational Behavior +12
Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory
George P. Baker, Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy · The Journal of Finance · 1988 · 1.8K citations · Full text
Do outside directors monitor managers?
John Byrd, Kent Hickman · Journal of Financial Economics · 1992 · 1.6K citations