Ethics · 2014 · 232 citations · 43 references
Social SciencesPhilosophyPsychologyAffective NeuroscienceExperimental PsychologyMoral PsychologyAffective Decision MakingBehavioral Decision-makingMoral CognitionMoral EmotionsMoral IntuitionMoral ReasoningAutomatic Moral EvaluationExperimental PhilosophyIntuition In Decision MakingIntuitive Decision-makingMoral AttunementMoral LearningPractical PhilosophyScenarios
Intuition—spontaneous, nondeliberative assessment—has long been indispensable in theoretical and practical philosophy alike. Recent research by psychologists and experimental philosophers has challenged our understanding of the nature and authority of moral intuitions by tracing them to “fast,” “automatic,” “button-pushing” responses of the affective system. This view of the affective system contrasts with a growing body of research in affective neuroscience which suggests that it is instead a flexible learning system that generates and updates a multidimensional evaluative landscape to guide decision and action. With this latter view in mind, I revisit some of the classic hypothetical scenarios used in experimental moral psychology.
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Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences.
Robert B. Zajonc · American Psychologist · 1980 · 7.8K citations · Full text
An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment
Joshua D. Greene, R. Brian Sommerville, Leigh E. Nystrom et al. · Science · 2001 · 4.6K citations