Publication | Closed Access
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
7.7K
Citations
158
References
2001
Year
Moral ReasoningBehavioral Decision MakingMoral PhilosophySocial PsychologyMoral IssueRational TailPsychologySocial SciencesSocial Intuitionist ModelEmotional DogSocial ReasoningMoral JudgmentBehavioral SciencesRationalist ModelsIntuitionSocial CognitionMoral PsychologyNormative EthicSocial Judgment
Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models that attribute moral judgment to moral reasoning. The author argues that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment but is a post hoc construction, and proposes the social intuitionist model as an alternative. The model emphasizes social and cultural influences over private reasoning and posits that moral judgment arises from quick, automatic intuitions. The model aligns better with recent findings across social, cultural, evolutionary, biological psychology, anthropology, and primatology than rationalist models.
Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent that rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.
| Year | Citations | |
|---|---|---|
Page 1
Page 1