Managerial and Decision Economics · 2010 · 58 citations · 26 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsStrategyAgency TheoryContract TheoryStrategic Decision-makingGame Theory In CompetitionInvestmentManagerial Decision MakingRisk AversionManagerial Optimism
Abstract This paper analyzes whether it might be desirable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain R&D strategy. I consider a Cournot model with an ex‐ante R&D stage where firms can invest in cost reduction before product market competition takes place. I show that firms want to hire overoptimistic managers and argue that a manager's type may serve as a substitute for strategic delegation via contracts. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment
Ulrike Malmendier, Geoffrey A. Tate · The Journal of Finance · 2005 · 3.7K citations · Full text