Journal of the Japanese and International Economies · 1987 · 21 citations · 16 references
Social SciencesBusiness EconomicsEconomicsAgency TheoryLabor EconomicsMicroeconomicsAgency CostsContract DesignInformation AsymmetryLaborOptimal ContractingTransaction Cost EconomicsAgency Contract InterpretationAgency In Contract FormationContracting EconomicsContracting FrictionsContracting IncentivesEquilibriumOptimal Contracting Theory
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Moral Hazard and Observability
Bengt Holmström · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1979 · 8.5K citations
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Martin Neil Baily · The Review of Economic Studies · 1974 · 897 citations