Nonlinear Incentive Contracts

Nonlinear Incentive Contracts is an incentive compensation framework in which the payment function relating agent effort to outcome is characteristically non-proportional, distinguished from linear contracts by incorporating varying marginal rewards across performance levels to better align principal-agent interests under risk and information asymmetry.

30

Publications

2.7K

Citations

43

Authors

52

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

4

Authors

43

  1. GS
    Greg Shaffer

    University of Rochester, United States

    3 publications · 624 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. DO
    D. O’Brien

    The University of Melbourne, Australia

    3 publications · 624 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. SL
    Stephen Leider

    University of Michigan, United States

    2 publications · 139 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. MM
    Mario Macis

    Johns Hopkins University, United States

    2 publications · 336 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. NL
    Nicola Lacetera

    University of Toronto, Canada

    2 publications · 336 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 43

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 6 publications · 160 citations

    6

    h-index

  2. The Review of Economic Studies

    3 publications · 273 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. The Journal of Finance

    2 publications · 260 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

    JEMS · 2 publications · 200 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Toulouse Capitole Publications (University Toulouse 1 Capitole)

    Repository · 1 publications · 32 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5