Nonlinear Incentive Contracts
Nonlinear Incentive Contracts is an incentive compensation framework in which the payment function relating agent effort to outcome is characteristically non-proportional, distinguished from linear contracts by incorporating varying marginal rewards across performance levels to better align principal-agent interests under risk and information asymmetry.
30
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2.7K
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43
Authors
52
Institutions
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2017–2026
4
30
Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts
D. O’Brien, Greg Shaffer · The RAND Journal of Economics · 1992 · 424 citations
Moral Hazard and the Portfolio Management Problem
Neal M. Stoughton · The Journal of Finance · 1993 · 223 citations
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University of Toronto
Toronto, Canada
3 h-index
3 publications
358 citations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
138 citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
2 h-index
2 publications
72 citations
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
70 citations
New Economic School
Moscow, Russia
2 h-index
3 publications
142 citations
Yale University
New Haven, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
142 citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
129 citations
European Central Bank
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
2 h-index
2 publications
143 citations
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Repository · 6 publications · 160 citations
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3 publications · 273 citations
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2 publications · 260 citations
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JEMS · 2 publications · 200 citations
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Repository · 1 publications · 32 citations
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