Negotiation Signaling

Negotiation Signaling is a strategic communication mechanism in diplomatic and insurgent negotiation contexts, whereby parties convey intent, resolve, or willingness to compromise through deliberate actions or statements that differentiate it from mere information exchange by their calculative and credibility-enhancing function.

5

Publications

317

Citations

11

Authors

8

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

2

Authors

11

  1. ST
    Steven Tadelis

    University of California, Berkeley, United States

    1 publications · 93 citations

    1

    h-index

  2. TB
    Thomas Blake

    University of California, Berkeley, United States

    1 publications · 93 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. GD
    Greg Dawson

    Simon Fraser University, Canada

    1 publications · 22 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. AR
    Alvaro Renedo Zalba

    Dana-Farber/Harvard Cancer Center, United States

    1 publications · 14 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. RT
    Robert Trager

    University of California, Los Angeles, United States

    1 publications · 28 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 11

Venues

  1. The Journal of Politics

    JP · 1 publications · 28 citations

    1

    h-index

  2. Journal of the Association for Information Systems

    JAIS · 1 publications · 22 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. Negotiation Journal

    1 publications · 14 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. Journal of Political Economy

    JPE · 1 publications · 93 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. International Journal of Conflict Management

    1 publications · 160 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5