Market Entry Deterrence

Market Entry Deterrence is a strategic interaction in multi-market competition where a firm discourages rivals from entering or expanding in a given market by leveraging its credible threat of competitive retaliation across multiple markets.

198

Publications

12.6K

Citations

284

Authors

200

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

12

Authors

284

  1. TS
    Thomas S. Robertson

    University of Pennsylvania, United States

    4 publications · 319 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. JE
    Joseph E. Harrington

    Johns Hopkins University, United States

    3 publications · 116 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. RW
    Roger Ware

    Pennsylvania State University, United States

    3 publications · 121 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. MS
    Marius Schwartz

    Georgetown University, United States

    3 publications · 142 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. AD
    Avinash Dixit

    Princeton University, United States

    3 publications · 2K citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 284

Venues

  1. The RAND Journal of Economics

    18 publications · 1.1K citations

    16

    h-index

  2. 9

    h-index

  3. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

    JEMS · 8 publications · 299 citations

    8

    h-index

  4. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 8 publications · 211 citations

    8

    h-index

  5. Journal of Industrial Economics

    7 publications · 427 citations

    7

    h-index

1–5