Market Entry Deterrence
Market Entry Deterrence is a strategic interaction in multi-market competition where a firm discourages rivals from entering or expanding in a given market by leveraging its credible threat of competitive retaliation across multiple markets.
198
Publications
12.6K
Citations
284
Authors
200
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
12
Parents
198
A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers
Avinash Dixit · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1979 · 957 citations
Steven C. Salop · American Economic Review · 2016 · 332 citations
Kenneth L. Judd · The RAND Journal of Economics · 1985 · 296 citations
Social Sciences, Economics, Strategy +17
1–5 of 198
284
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200
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
11 h-index
13 publications
1.3K citations
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
5 h-index
5 publications
489 citations

Cornell University
Ithaca, United States
5 h-index
6 publications
344 citations
KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
4 h-index
5 publications
125 citations
Michigan State University
East Lansing, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
277 citations
University of Iowa
Iowa City, United States
4 h-index
6 publications
288 citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
4 h-index
6 publications
376 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
302 citations
1–8 of 200
18 publications · 1.1K citations
16
h-index
9 publications · 437 citations
9
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JEMS · 8 publications · 299 citations
8
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Repository · 8 publications · 211 citations
8
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7 publications · 427 citations
7
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1–5