Equal-split Bargaining

Equal-Split Bargaining is a bargaining solution concept in game theory that prescribes the division of surplus between parties by allocating equal shares to each participant, distinguishing it from other solution concepts by its reliance solely on symmetry and equal entitlement rather than strategic or sequential reasoning.

12

Publications

1K

Citations

24

Authors

20

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

2

Variants

Equal Split Solution

Authors

24

  1. GD
    Geoffroy de Clippel

    Brown University, United States

    2 publications · 30 citations

    2

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  2. KR
    Kareen Rozen

    John Brown University, United States

    2 publications · 30 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. EH
    Eliran Halali

    Bar-Ilan University, Israel

    1 publications · 69 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. NC
    Nels Christiansen

    Trinity University, United States

    1 publications · 24 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. SG
    Sotiris Georganas

    Royal Holloway University of London, United Kingdom

    1 publications · 24 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 24

Venues

  1. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

    2 publications · 55 citations

    2

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  2. American Economic Journal Microeconomics

    2 publications · 40 citations

    2

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  3. Games and Economic Behavior

    1 publications · 220 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

    1 publications · 69 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Econometrica

    1 publications · 446 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5