Equal-split Bargaining
Equal-Split Bargaining is a bargaining solution concept in game theory that prescribes the division of surplus between parties by allocating equal shares to each participant, distinguishing it from other solution concepts by its reliance solely on symmetry and equal entitlement rather than strategic or sequential reasoning.
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2017–2026
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Equal Split Solution
Parents
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H. Steihaus · Econometrica · 1948 · 446 citations
Problems of fair division and the Egalitarian solution
William Thomson · Journal of Economic Theory · 1983 · 126 citations
The rationality of splitting equally
Gary E. Bolton · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 1997 · 38 citations
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Royal Holloway University of London
Egham, United Kingdom
2 h-index
2 publications
244 citations
John Brown University
Siloam Springs, United States
2 h-index
4 publications
60 citations

Trinity University
San Antonio, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
24 citations
University of Kaiserslautern
Kaiserslautern, Germany
1 h-index
1 publications
17 citations
Daimler (Germany)
Stuttgart, Germany
1 h-index
1 publications
17 citations
Savannah State University
Savannah, United States
1 h-index
2 publications
32 citations

Bilkent University
Ankara, Türkiye
1 h-index
1 publications
10 citations
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Berlin, Germany
1 h-index
2 publications
440 citations
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2 publications · 55 citations
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2 publications · 40 citations
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1 publications · 220 citations
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1 publications · 69 citations
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1 publications · 446 citations
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