Disclosure Games

Disclosure Games is a theoretical framework in information economics that models strategic interactions in which an informed agent chooses whether and how much private information to reveal to an uninformed agent, balancing the trade-off between influencing beliefs and preserving informational advantages.

101

Publications

7.8K

Citations

169

Authors

128

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

32

Variants

Information Disclosure Games

Authors

169

  1. JZ
    Jun Zhuang

    University at Buffalo, State University of New York, United States

    4 publications · 220 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. JL
    Jingfeng Lu

    National University of Singapore, Singapore

    4 publications · 131 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. QF
    Qiang Fu

    National University of Singapore, Singapore

    3 publications · 91 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. DM
    Daniel Martin

    Northwestern University, United States

    3 publications · 243 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. GZ
    Ginger Zhe Jin

    University of Maryland, College Park, United States

    3 publications · 243 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 169

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 17 publications · 704 citations

    13

    h-index

  2. The Review of Economic Studies

    5 publications · 1.2K citations

    5

    h-index

  3. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

    4 publications · 109 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. Journal of Accounting and Economics

    4 publications · 1K citations

    4

    h-index

  5. Economic Theory

    3 publications · 89 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5