Bayesian Game Extensions

Bayesian Game Extensions is a formal framework in game theory that extends strategic form games by incorporating incomplete information, wherein players have probabilistic beliefs about others' types and payoffs, and equilibrium analysis is conducted using Bayesian updating and expected utility maximization.

13

Publications

435

Citations

23

Authors

16

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

0

Authors

23

  1. TR
    Tim Roughgarden

    Stanford University, United States

    3 publications · 163 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. AH
    Aviad Heifetz

    Open University of Israel, Israel

    2 publications · 38 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. BC
    Burkhard C. Schipper

    University of California, Davis, United States

    2 publications · 38 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. MM
    Martin Meier

    ETH Zurich, Switzerland

    2 publications · 38 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. MT
    Milind Tambe

    University of Southern California, United States

    1 publications · 30 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 23

Venues

  1. Theoretical Economics

    TE · 1 publications · 17 citations

    1

    h-index

  2. Decision Support Systems

    1 publications · 47 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. Journal of the Physical Society of Japan

    1 publications · 42 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. PLoS ONE

    1 publications · 10 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 1 publications · 27 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5