Agent Opportunism
Agent Opportunism is a type of strategic behavior in principal-agent relationships wherein the agent exploits informational asymmetry or relaxed oversight to pursue self-interest at the expense of the principal, deviating from intended objectives despite contractual or fiduciary obligations.
20
Publications
1.2K
Citations
37
Authors
23
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
4
Parents
20
Relational Contracts and the Value of Loyalty
Simon Board · American Economic Review · 2011 · 147 citations
1–5 of 20
37
2
h-index
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia
1 publications · 10 citations
1
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1
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1
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1
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1–5 of 37
23
Airlangga University
Surabaya, Indonesia
2 h-index
4 publications
72 citations
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
16 citations

Griffith University
Brisbane, Australia
1 h-index
1 publications
22 citations
Russian Academy of Sciences
Moscow, Russia
1 h-index
2 publications
34 citations
University of Florida
Gainesville, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
142 citations

University of Alberta
Edmonton, Canada
1 h-index
2 publications
62 citations
Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Yekaterinburg, Russia
1 h-index
2 publications
34 citations
Loughborough University
Loughborough, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
22 citations
1–8 of 23
IJPA · 2 publications · 30 citations
2
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2 publications · 44 citations
2
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1 publications · 19 citations
1
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Repository · 1 publications · 39 citations
1
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AMP · 1 publications · 91 citations
1
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1–5