Agent Opportunism

Agent Opportunism is a type of strategic behavior in principal-agent relationships wherein the agent exploits informational asymmetry or relaxed oversight to pursue self-interest at the expense of the principal, deviating from intended objectives despite contractual or fiduciary obligations.

20

Publications

1.2K

Citations

37

Authors

23

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

4

Authors

37

  1. DK
    Deddy Kurniawansyah

    Airlangga University, Indonesia

    2 publications · 44 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. AT
    Andrey Tkachenko

    National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia

    1 publications · 10 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. DM
    Danny Miller

    HEC Montréal, Canada

    1 publications · 91 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. SK
    Sigit Kurnianto

    Airlangga University, Indonesia

    1 publications · 14 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. EA
    Erin Anderson

    University of Pennsylvania, United States

    1 publications · 142 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 37

Venues

  1. International Journal of Public Administration

    IJPA · 2 publications · 30 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Dan Bisnis Airlangga

    2 publications · 44 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. Kyklos

    1 publications · 19 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 1 publications · 39 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Academy of Management Perspectives

    AMP · 1 publications · 91 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5