Review of Financial Studies · 2020 · 267 citations · 23 references
BusinessEconomicsFinanceBankingBehavioral FinanceFinancial EconomicsAdverse SelectionConsumer CreditCredit MarketsCredit RiskFinancial RiskMicrofinanceBorrower Default RiskBorrower Risk AssessmentBorrower ScreeningBorrower-lender Information AsymmetryInformation Advantage In LendingLoan ScreeningMarket ShareMarket Share Drivers
Abstract We study the personal credit market using unique individual-level data covering fintech and traditional lenders. We show that fintech lenders acquire market share by lending first to higher-risk borrowers and then to safer borrowers, and rely mainly on hard information to make credit decisions. Fintech borrowers are significantly more likely to default than neighbor individuals with the same characteristics borrowing from traditional financial institutions. Furthermore, they tend to experience a short-lived reduction in the cost of credit, because their indebtedness increases more than non-fintech borrowers after loan origination. However, fintech lenders’ pricing strategies are likely to take this into account.
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Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Andrew Weiss · American Economic Review · 1981 · 12.9K citations · Full text
Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks
Greg Buchak, Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski et al. · Journal of Financial Economics · 2018 · 1.7K citations · Full text
Law, Banking Law, Finance +14
The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market
Lawrence M. Ausubel · American Economic Review · 1991 · 789 citations
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Peer-to-Peer Lenders Versus Banks: Substitutes or Complements?
Huan Tang · Review of Financial Studies · 2018 · 656 citations
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