Management Science · 2014 · 86 citations · 37 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsEconomicsAdvertisingAuction TheoryMicroeconomicsAuction DesignBidder Valuation ModelsPrice DiscriminationSecond-price AuctionsAlgorithmic Price DiscriminationAuction Bidding BehaviorConsumer Surplus AnalysisEquilibriumPosted PricingRandomized AuctionRevenue IncreasesSecond-price Auction Bidding
Increasingly detailed consumer information makes sophisticated price discrimination possible. At fine levels of aggregation, demand may not obey standard regularity conditions. We propose a new randomized sales mechanism for such environments. Bidders can “buy-it-now” at a posted price, or “take-a-chance” in an auction where the top d > 1 bidders are equally likely to win. The randomized allocation incentivizes high-valuation bidders to buy-it-now. We analyze equilibrium behavior and apply our analysis to advertiser bidding data from Microsoft Advertising Exchange. In counterfactual simulations, our mechanism increases revenue by 4.4% and consumer surplus by 14.5% compared to an optimal second-price auction. This paper was accepted by Assaf Zeevi, stochastic models and simulation.
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Roger B. Myerson · Mathematics of Operations Research · 1981 · 6.1K citations
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Paul Milgrom, Robert J. Weber · Econometrica · 1982 · 3.8K citations
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