Asymmetric Auctions with Resale

Isa E. Hafalir, Vijay Krishna

American Economic Review · 2008 · 134 citations · 31 references

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TL;DR

The paper investigates first‑ and second‑price auctions with resale under independent private values. The model assumes asymmetric bidders and post‑auction resale via monopoly pricing, where the winner offers a take‑it‑or‑leave‑it deal to the loser. The study finds that a first‑price auction with resale has a unique monotonic equilibrium and yields higher expected revenue than a second‑price auction, enabling a general revenue ranking not possible without resale. JEL classification: D44.

Abstract

We study first- and second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private values. With asymmetric bidders, the resulting inefficiencies create a motive for post-auction trade which, in our model, takes place via monopoly pricing—the winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser. We show (a) a first-price auction with resale has a unique monotonic equilibrium; and (b) with resale, the expected revenue from a first-price auction exceeds that from a second-price auction. The inclusion of resale possibilities thus permits a general revenue ranking of the two auctions that is not available when these are excluded. (JEL D44)

References

31