Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · 2010 · 22 citations · 19 references
Social SciencesEconomicsCartel EnforcementCompetition PolicyExecutive CompensationCoach-athlete RelationshipsNash EquilibriumPerformance-based PayAthlete Income RulesCoach-player RelationshipEmployment Income Of Athletes
Recently, a great deal of controversy has been generated from the salaries earned by head coaches in the NCAA. Although many figures in the world of sports earn high salaries, one important difference in the case of the NCAA is that the players do not get paid. We develop a model that shows that a cartel agreement to not pay the players raises the coach's salary if some players choose where to play based on the identity of the coach. The agreement not to pay the players improves competitive balance in the baseline model, but this result does not generalize.
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POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS*
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