Operations Research · 2017 · 135 citations · 11 references
Social SciencesBusiness EconomicsEconomicsDecision TheoryGame TheoryIncentive SystemsGame Theory In CompetitionIncentive SchemesIndividual IncentivesMechanism DesignNash EquilibriumTournament IncentivesEffort Provision In TournamentsEvaluationIndependent AgentsPrize IncentivesPrize StructurePrize-based IncentivesTournament Incentives In OrganizationsWinner-take-all Incentives
In an innovation tournament, an organizer solicits innovative ideas from a number of independent agents. Agents exert effort to develop their solutions, but their outcomes are unknown due to technical uncertainty and/or subjective evaluation criteria. To incentivize agents to make their best effort, the organizer needs to devise a proper award scheme. While extant literature either assumes a winner-take-all scheme a priori or shows its optimality under specific distributions for uncertainty, this paper derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which the winner-take-all scheme is optimal. These conditions are violated when agents perceive it very likely that only few agents receive high evaluation or when a tournament does not require substantial increase in agents’ marginal cost of effort to develop high-quality solutions. Yet, the winner-take-all scheme is optimal in many practical situations, especially when agents have symmetric beliefs about their evaluation. In this case, the organizer should offer a larger winner prize when he is interested in obtaining a higher number of good solutions, but interestingly the organizer need not necessarily raise the winner prize when anticipating more participants to a tournament. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1575 .
11
Increasing risk: I. A definition
Michael Rothschild, Joseph E. Stiglitz · Journal of Economic Theory · 1970 · 3.9K citations
I tube, you tube, everybody tubes
Meeyoung Cha, Haewoon Kwak, Pablo Rodríguez et al. · 2007 · 1.6K citations · Full text
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
Jerry R. Green, Nancy L. Stokey · Journal of Political Economy · 1983 · 1K citations
Innovation Contests, Open Innovation, and Multiagent Problem Solving
Christian Terwiesch, Yi Xu · Management Science · 2008 · 928 citations · Full text
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests
Benny Moldovanu, Aner Sela · American Economic Review · 2001 · 897 citations