Management Science · 2019 · 47 citations · 31 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsFinanceContract TheoryPrivate EquityVenture CapitalCarried InterestLimited Partnership AgreementsPrivate Equity Fund EconomicsPublic-private Partnership EconomicsVenture Capital FundraisingVenture FinancingCarried Interest CompensationCarried Interest EffectsCarried Interest IncentivesGeneral Partner EconomicsPay-performance PersistencePrivate Equity FundraisingPrivate Equity PerformanceVenture Capital Contracting
We offer the first empirical analysis connecting the timing of general partner (GP) compensation to private equity fund performance. Using detailed information on limited partnership agreements between private equity limited and general partners, we find that “GP-friendly” contracts—agreements that pay general partners on a deal-by-deal basis instead of withholding carried interest until a benchmark return has been earned—are associated with higher returns, both gross and net of fees. This is robust to measures of performance persistence, time period effects, and other contract terms and is related to exit-timing incentives. Timing practices balance GP incentives against limited partner downside protection. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.
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Moral Hazard and Observability
Bengt Holmström · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1979 · 8.5K citations
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Canice Prendergast · Journal of Economic Literature · 1999 · 3.4K citations
Gustavo Manso · The Journal of Finance · 2011 · 1.9K citations · Full text
Management, Innovation Management, Executive Compensation +16