Incentivizing the Workers for Truth Discovery in Crowdsourcing with Copiers

Abstract

Crowdsourcing has become an efficient paradigm for performing large scale tasks. Truth discovery and incentive mechanism are fundamentally important for the crowdsourcing system. Many truth discovery methods and incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing have been proposed. However, most of them cannot be applied to dealing with the crowdsourcing with copiers. To address the issue, we formulate the problem of maximizing the social welfare such that all tasks can be completed with the least confidence for truth discovery. We design an incentive mechanism consisting of truth discovery stage and reverse auction stage. In truth discovery stage, we estimate the truth for each task based on both the dependence and accuracy of workers. In reverse auction stage, we design a greedy algorithm to select the winners and determine the payment. Through both rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the proposed mechanisms achieve computational efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness, and guaranteed approximation. Moreover, our truth discovery method shows prominent advantage in terms of precision when there are copiers in the crowdsourcing systems.