IEEE Micro · 2020 · 84 citations · 43 references
ComputingComputer EngineeringComputer ScienceComputer SecurityHardware SecuritySecurity ArchitectureData SecurityMicroarchitectural SecuritySide-channel AnalysisSide-channel AttacksSpeculative ExecutionAbstractionCovert Channel MitigationMicroarchitectural Information LeakageMicroarchitectural Side-channel AttacksSpeculationSpeculation DetectionSpeculative Execution AttacksTaint Detection
Speculative execution attacks present an enormous security threat, capable of reading arbitrary program data under malicious speculation, and later exfiltrating that data over microarchitectural covert channels. This article proposes speculative taint tracking (STT), a high-security and high-performance hardware mechanism to block these attacks. The main idea is that it is safe to execute and selectively forward the results of speculative instructions that read secrets, as long as we can prove that the forwarded results do not reach potential covert channels. The technical core of the article is a new abstraction to help identify all covert channels, and an architecture to quickly identify when a covert channel is no longer a threat. We further conduct a detailed formal analysis on the scheme and prove security in a companion document. When evaluated on SPEC06 workloads, STT incurs 8.5% or 14.5% performance overhead relative to an insecure machine.
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