An Evolution Analysis of Collaborative Innovation Network considering Government Subsidies and Supervision

Abstract

Collaborative innovation networks have the basic attributes of complex networks. The interaction of innovation network members has promoted the development of collaborative innovation networks. Using the game‐based theory in the B‐A scale‐free network context, this paper builds an evolutionary game model of network members and explores the emergence mechanism from collaborative innovation behavior to the macroevolution of networks. The results show that revenue distribution, compensation of the betrayer, government subsidies, and supervision have positively contributed to the continued stability of collaborative innovation networks. However, the effect mechanisms are dissimilar for networks of different scales. In small networks, the rationality of the revenue distribution among members that have similar strengths should receive more attention, and the government should implement medium‐intensity supervision measures. In large networks, however, compensation of the betrayer should be attached greater importance to, and financial support from the government can promote stable evolution more effectively.