Journal of European Public Policy · 2019 · 28 citations · 24 references
Social SciencesPublic LawPublic PolicyCollective BargainingNegotiationSeparation Of PowersEuropean GovernanceEuropean IntegrationEuropean LawEuropean PoliticsEuropean Public PolicyEuropean Union StudiesEuropean Union Executive PoliticsEuropean Union Legislative PoliticsEuropean Union Policy-makingEuropean Union PoliticsEuropean Union Regulatory PoliticsEuropean Union TreatiesInstitutional BargainingLisbon System
The European Union (EU) is currently enmeshed in a polycrisis. Yet, a treaty change to ease these crises is out of reach. We ask how a supranational actor, the European Parliament (EP), strives for more de facto powers amidst this situation. Relying on refined propositions of inter-institutional bargaining theory, we argue that the EP skilfully deploys strategies in order to extend its powers beyond the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. Based on original interview material, we assess these propositions in two crisis-ridden areas of EU decision-making: economic governance and the negotiation of trade agreements. We find that the EP extended its powers in both policies by applying a set of particular strategies, which include obstructing the decision-making process, acting as a first-mover and mobilizing the public. Finally, we reflect on the possible consequences of this self-empowerment for the EP’s legitimacy.
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