Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · 2018 · 66 citations · 36 references
BusinessStrategic ManagementStrategyBusiness StrategyCorporate FinanceCorporate StrategyCash Incentive CompensationInvestmentLiquidityLiquidity ManagementLiquidity RiskTournament IncentivesAcquisitionsCorporate Cash HoldingsCorporate Cash PolicyExecutive Compensation EffectsExecutive Pay IncentivesFirm Value EffectsMarket ShareTournament Incentives In Organizations
We evaluate the link between chief executive officer (CEO) industry tournament incentives (ITIs) and the product-market benefits of corporate liquidity. We find that ITIs increase the level and marginal value of cash holdings. Furthermore, ITIs strengthen the relation between excess cash and market-share gains, especially for firms that face significant competitive threats. Additionally, for firms with excess cash, higher ITIs lead to increased research and development (R&D) expenses, capital expenditures, and spending on focused acquisitions as well as reduced payouts. Overall, our findings suggest that ITIs increase the value of cash by incentivizing CEOs to deploy cash strategically to capture its product-market benefits.
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