Studies on Robust Social Influence Mechanisms: Incentives for Efficient Network Routing in Uncertain Settings

Abstract

Many of today's engineered systems are tightly interconnected with their users, and in many cases, system performance depends greatly on user behavior [1]. As a result, the traditional lines between engineering and the social sciences are becoming increasingly blurred, and analytical tools such as game theory are finding new applications in engineering [2], [3]. It is often insufficient to judge an engineered system on its technical merits alone since strategic user behavior can lead to unpredictable and/or undesirable results [4]. Of particular importance to this article are socially integrated engineering problems in which users' strategic behavior has a significant impact on overall system performance. These types of systems appear in a variety of contexts in theory and practice; transportation networks [5], ride-sharing applications [6], [7], supply-chain management [8], cloud computing [9], and electric power grids [10] are immediate examples. A common problem in these settings is that individual user incentives may not be aligned with the objectives of the central planner. Thus, in addition to the technical challenges of a socially integrated engineering problem, an engineer may need to consider methods of influencing individual user behavior to effect positive change on aggregate system performance [11]. These behavior-influencing mechanisms often take the form of offering users a tradeoff between quality of service and monetary incentive.