Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945–83

TLDR

Coalition formation has been extensively studied, yet empirical research on how coalition payoffs are distributed—central to many theories—has been limited, leaving key assumptions largely untested despite recent theoretical developments. This article tests the applicability of recent payoff‑distribution theories to European coalition governments.

Abstract

Coalition formation has been the subject of much theoretical and empirical work in the past decade or so. The theories that have been tested all rest, one way or another, upon assumptions about the ways in which the payoff accruing to a particular coalition is distributed among its members. Yet much less empirical work has been done on the process of payoff distribution . Thus some of the fundamental assumptions of coalition theories, at least in terms of their practical application to coalition governments , have been more scantily tested. Several theories of payoff distribution have been recently developed, however. It is the purpose of this article to test the application of these theories to the practice of coalition government in Europe.