Management Science · 2001 · 1.1K citations · 26 references
ManagementOperations ManagementSupply Chain ManagementContract TheoryContractsDemand ForecastingContract ManagementDemand PlanningOptimal ContractingSupplier ManagementComplianceDemand Forecast SharingFlexibilitySole-source ProcurementSupplier ComplianceSupply Chain Contract DesignSupply Chain ForecastingSupply Chain Performance Evaluation
Forecast sharing is studied in a supply chain where a manufacturer faces stochastic demand for a single product and a supplier is the sole source of a critical component. The study investigates contracts that enable credible demand forecast sharing under both forced and voluntary compliance regimes. The process involves the manufacturer submitting an initial forecast and contract, the supplier building capacity if it accepts, then the manufacturer receiving an updated forecast and placing a final order, with forced compliance limiting supplier flexibility and voluntary compliance allowing greater flexibility. Optimal performance requires the manufacturer to truthfully share her forecast, yet she may inflate it to induce more capacity, and the supplier’s awareness of this bias can erode trust and harm performance.
Forecast sharing is studied in a supply chain with a manufacturer that faces stochastic demand for a single product and a supplier that is the sole source for a critical component. The following sequence of events occurs: the manufacturer provides her initial forecast to the supplier along with a contract, the supplier constructs capacity (if he accepts the contract), the manufacturer receives an updated forecast and submits a final order. Two contract compliance regimes are considered. If the supplier accepts the contract under forced compliance then he has little flexibility with respect to his capacity choice; under voluntary compliance, however, he maintains substantial flexibility. Optimal supply chain performance requires the manufacturer to share her initial forecast truthfully, but she has an incentive to inflate her forecast to induce the supplier to build more capacity. The supplier is aware of this bias, and so may not trust the manufacturer's forecast, harming supply chain performance. We study contracts that allow the supply chain to share demand forecasts credibly under either compliance regime.
26
Michael Spence · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1973 · 15.2K citations
Mathematical Theory of Reliability
A. P. Basu, Richard E. Barlow, Frank Proschan · Econometrica · 1966 · 2.7K citations