Econometrica · 1993 · 1.1K citations · 11 references
Social SciencesEconomicsEvolutionary BiologyEvolutionary TheoryExperimental EconomicsGame TheoryCoordination GamesDynamic GamesEvolutionary DynamicsEvolutionary Game TheoryMatching TheoryNoncooperative Game TheoryDynamic Systems ApproachEvolutionary Coordination GamesFinite TimeGame-theoretic EvolutionLearning In Coordination GamesLearning In Dynamic GamesLearning In GamesMatching
This paper discusses the dynamic implications of learning in a large population coordination game, focusing on the structure of the matching process which describes how players meet.As in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) a combination of experimentation and myopia creates "evolutionary" forces which lead players to coordinate on the risk dominant equilibrium.To describe play with finite time horizons it is necessary to consider the rates at which the dynamic systems converge.In large populations with uniform matching, play is determined largely by historical factors.In contrast, when players interact with small sets of neighbors it is more reasonable to assume that evolutionary forces may determine the outcome.
11
EVOLUTION IN MENDELIAN POPULATIONS
Sewall Wright · Genetics · 1931 · 9.1K citations · Full text
H. Peyton Young · Econometrica · 1993 · 2.4K citations
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
Michihiro Kandori, George J. Mailath, Rafael Rob · Econometrica · 1993 · 2.1K citations
Mathematical Population Genetics
Ellen Baake, Warren J. Ewens, Anton Wakolbinger · Oberwolfach Reports · 2006 · 1.7K citations
Life Sciences, Biology, Genetics +12
The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction
Lawrence E. Blume · Games and Economic Behavior · 1993 · 1.4K citations · Full text