Publication | Closed Access
Price-Induced Patterns of Competition
673
Citations
25
References
1989
Year
MarketingEconomicsPrice-induced PatternsPreference DistributionPrice ChangesMarket MechanismPrice FormationManagementPrice DiscriminationBusinessConsumer ResearchBrand CompetitionConsumer BehaviorMarket BehaviorMarket DesignMarket PowerConsumer Choice
The paper begins with a basic utility model that explores how three major preference‑distribution classes affect expected competition patterns. The study investigates how price changes shape brand competition, proposing a price‑tier model to test this theory. The authors estimate this price‑tier model on 28 brands across four product categories to operationalize the theory. The analysis reveals an asymmetric price‑competition pattern: higher‑price, higher‑quality brands capture share from same‑tier and lower‑tier rivals, while lower‑price, lower‑quality brands gain only from their own and lower tiers, consistent with a bimodal preference distribution placing the price indifference point toward the lower‑quality end.
This research focuses on how price changes influence the observed pattern of brand competition. The paper begins with a basic utility model formulation and examines the implications of three major classes of preference distributions on the expected patterns of competition. A price-tier model is proposed to operationalize the theory and to allow predictive testing. The price-tier model is estimated on 28 brands across four product categories. The results show a specific asymmetric pattern of price competition. Higher-price, higher quality brands steal share from other brands in the same price-quality tier, as well as from brands in the tier below. However, lower-price, lower-quality brands take sales from their own tier and the tier below brands, but do not steal significant share from the tiers above. The results are consistent with a bimodal preference distribution, with the regular price indifference point being located toward the lower-quality end of the preference distribution for the categories analyzed.
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