Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts

Ken Burdett, Melvyn Coles

Econometrica · 2003 · 271 citations · 14 references

DOIFull text

Open access

Concepts

TL;DR

The study investigates a labor‑market matching model in which firms offer wage‑tenure contracts and workers, both employed and unemployed, search for new job opportunities. The model incorporates wage‑tenure contracts into the matching process, allowing workers to move between jobs while wages rise smoothly with tenure. The authors establish a unique equilibrium in which all contracts yield wage growth with tenure, job turnover occurs, the distribution of initial wage offers is nondegenerate, and equilibrium characteristics are explicit functions of preferences and market parameters.

Abstract

In this study we consider a labor market matching model where firms post wage-tenure contracts and workers, both employed and unemployed, search for new job opportunities. Given workers are risk averse, we establish there is a unique equilibrium in the environment considered. Although firms in the market make different offers in equilibrium, all post a wage-tenure contract that implies a worker's wage increases smoothly with tenure at the firm. As firms make different offers, there is job turnover, as employed workers move jobs as the opportunity arises. This implies the increase in a worker's wage can be due to job-to-job movements as well as wage-tenure effects. Further, there is a nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of initial wage offers that is differentiateable on its support except for a mass point at the lowest initial wage. We also show that relevant characteristics of the equilibrium can be written as explicit functions of preferences and the other market parameters.

References

14