Solving nonlinear principal-agent problems using bilevel programming

Moral Hazard and Observability

Bengt Holmström · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1979 · 8.5K citations

Business, Business Economics, Contract Law +17

Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design

Bengt Holmström, Paul Milgrom · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · 1991 · 6.1K citations

Business, Business Economics, Economics +14

Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives

Bengt Holmström, Paul Milgrom · Econometrica · 1987 · 3K citations

Business, Business Economics, Economics +17

Contracting theory and accounting

Richard A. Lambert · Journal of Accounting and Economics · 2001 · 1K citations

Business, Accountancy, Accounting +10

Sensitivity, Precision, and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation

Rajiv D. Banker, Srikant M. Datar · Journal of Accounting Research · 1989 · 930 citations

Business, Accountancy, Accounting +15