Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?

TLDR

Recent reports indicate that most commercial fisheries may collapse within decades, and while poor governance is often blamed, rights‑based catch shares are theorized to incentivize sustainable harvest and reduce collapse risk. The study tests whether catch‑share reforms deliver the theorized benefits by compiling a global database of fisheries institutions and catch statistics from 1950 to 2003. The authors assembled data on 11,135 fisheries worldwide, linking institutional arrangements to catch statistics over five decades. Implementation of catch shares halts and even reverses the global trend toward collapse, indicating that institutional change can profoundly shape the future of fisheries.

Abstract

Recent reports suggest that most of the world's commercial fisheries could collapse within decades. Although poor fisheries governance is often implicated, evaluation of solutions remains rare. Bioeconomic theory and case studies suggest that rights-based catch shares can provide individual incentives for sustainable harvest that is less prone to collapse. To test whether catch-share fishery reforms achieve these hypothetical benefits, we have compiled a global database of fisheries institutions and catch statistics in 11,135 fisheries from 1950 to 2003. Implementation of catch shares halts, and even reverses, the global trend toward widespread collapse. Institutional change has the potential for greatly altering the future of global fisheries.