Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks

TLDR

In markets for retail financial products and health services, consumers rely on intermediaries, while providers compete to influence advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions. We formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from both positive and normative perspectives. The model characterizes situations where mandatory disclosure and commission caps produce unintended welfare consequences. Findings indicate that commissions make advisors responsive to supply‑side incentives. JEL codes: D21, D82, D83, G21, L15, L25.

Abstract

In markets for retail financial products and health services, consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs. Product providers, in turn, compete to influence the intermediaries' advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions. Motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices, we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint. The model highlights the role of commissions in making the advisor responsive to supply-side incentives. We characterize situations when commonly adopted policies such as mandatory disclosure and caps on commissions have unintended welfare consequences. (JEL D21, D82, D83, G21, L15, L25)