The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

TLDR

The chapter presents a theory of nuclear weapons proliferation. The chapter uses a structural analysis of post‑World War II international politics to link bipolarity with a slower pace of nuclear proliferation. The findings show that bipolarity, through superpower influence, dampens systemic drivers such as the security dilemma, slowing nuclear proliferation, and that a structural analysis alone does not support optimistic expectations.

Abstract

This chapter argues that a structural analysis of international relations does not lend support to these earnest hopes. It presents a theory of nuclear weapons proliferation. The chapter argues that in a bipolar system the superpowers do have a specific role: their preponderance allows them to attenuate systemic characteristics. It provides examples of nuclear weapons proliferation and the creation of nato to show that a concerted effort by a superpower in a bipolar system reduces the influence of systemic characteristics such as the security dilemma and reliance on self-help. The chapter outlines a structural analysis of international politics, highlighting those elements of the theory that bear more directly on the question of proliferation. It discusses the structure of post-Second World War international politics to show the causal relationship between bipolarity and the slow pace of nuclear proliferation.