Cooperation under the Security Dilemma

TLDR

International anarchy and the resulting security dilemma make it difficult for states to realize their common interests. The study examines when and why this dilemma weakens and cooperation becomes more likely. Using a Prisoner’s Dilemma model and a defense‑offense asymmetry analysis, the authors show cooperation is more likely when exploitation costs are low, mutual gains are high, expectations of cooperation are mutual, and defense dominates offense with differing postures, yielding four security worlds shaped by geography and technology. The authors find that geography and technology shape the two key variables—exploitation costs and defense‑offense asymmetry—creating four distinct security worlds.

Abstract

International anarchy and the resulting security dilemma (i.e., policies which increase one state's security tend to decrease that of others) make it difficult for states to realize their common interests. Two approaches are used to show when and why this dilemma operates less strongly and cooperation is more likely. First, the model of the Prisoner's Dilemma is used to demonstrate that cooperation is more likely when the costs of being exploited and the gains of exploiting others are low, when the gains from mutual cooperation and the costs of mutual noncooperation are high, and when each side expects the other to cooperate. Second, the security dilemma is ameliorated when the defense has the advantage over the offense and when defensive postures differ from offensive ones. These two variables, which can generate four possible security worlds, are influenced by geography and technology.