Journal of Accounting Research · 2001 · 399 citations · 5 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsEconomicsAgency TheoryContract TheoryIncentive SystemsAgency ConflictsIncentive CompatibilityIncentive SchemesOptimal ContractingPrincipal-agent ProblemsPrincipal-agent TheoryAgency Cost TheoryAgency Theory In CompensationCompensation Contract DesignCompensation Risk TakingCompensation Sensitivity To PerformanceOptimal Contracting TheoryOptimal Incentive ContractsPerformance Measure Weighting
This paper uses an agency theory model in which the agent's actions are multi‐dimensional to analyze the optimal weights to apply to performance measures in a compensation contract. We show how the optimal contract trades off the congruity of the overall performance measure with the desire to minimize the risk imposed upon the agent. In contrast to the single action case, we find that an increase in the sensitivity of a performance measure to an agent's action does not necessarily increase the weight placed on that performance measure, even if that measure is perfectly congruent with the firm's outcome.
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The balanced scorecard : measures that drive performance
R. S. Caplan · Harvard business review · 1992 · 12.2K citations
Management, Performance Management, Strategic Management +14
On the Efficiency of Stock-based Compensation
Jonathan M. Paul · Review of Financial Studies · 1992 · 285 citations