Mathematics of Operations Research · 1981 · 334 citations · 11 references
Social SciencesEconomicsCooperative EconomicsGame TheoryMicroeconomicsBargaining TheoryCooperative Game TheoryNoncooperative Game TheoryWelfare EconomicsCoalition EquilibriumConvex GamesFuzzy GamesGames With Side Payments
A fuzzy coalition assigns each player a participation rate in [0,1] and the coalition worth is a positively homogeneous function; the fuzzy extension of an ordinary game is the least positively‑homogeneous superadditive function majorizing the original worth. We derive versions of known results on core, equilibria, and Shapley‑values for cooperative fuzzy games and provide an axiomatization of values for fuzzy games with side payments. The analysis extends ordinary games to fuzzy subsets, employs superadditivity and positive homogeneity of coalition worth functions, and proves core existence and equilibrium equivalence for fuzzy games with and without side payments. When the coalition worth is superadditive, the fuzzy game with side payments has a nonempty core; the fuzzy extension always has a nonempty core, coincides with the original core if it exists, analogous results hold without side payments, and the set of Walras equilibria coincides with the fuzzy core of an economy.
We derive versions of known results dealing with core, equilibria and Shapley-values of cooperative games in the case of cooperative fuzzy games, i.e., games defined on fuzzy subsets of the set of n players. A fuzzy coalition is an n-vector τ = (τ i ) associating with each player i his “rate of participation” τ i ∈ [0, 1] in the fuzzy coalition and the real number v(·) is the coalition worth, assumed to be positively homogeneous. If also v is superadditive, or equivalently concave, the fuzzy game with side payments has a nonempty core. Associated with the coalition-worth function for any ordinary game with side payments is a fuzzy extension thereof, viz., the fuzzy game whose coalition-worth function is the least positively-homogeneous superadditive function majorizing the coalition-worth function of the original game. The fuzzy extension always has a nonempty core. Moreover, if the original game has a nonempty core, it coincides with that of its fuzzy extension. Analogous results are established for games without side payments. An axiomatization of “values” of fuzzy games with side payments is also given. The results are applied to show that the set of Walras equilibria coincides with the fuzzy core of an economy.
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Markets with a Continuum of Traders
Robert J. Aumann · Econometrica · 1964 · 1.2K citations
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Oliver Hart, Werner Hildenbrand · The Economic Journal · 1975 · 1.2K citations
Herbert E. Scarf · Econometrica · 1967 · 705 citations
Lloyd S. Shapley, Martín Shubik · Journal of Economic Theory · 1969 · 399 citations