Coalition Equilibrium

Coalition Equilibrium is a solution concept in cooperative game theory that identifies a stable partition of players into coalitions such that no subset of players has both the incentive and the ability to deviate and form a new coalition to achieve higher collective payoffs under a specified stability criterion.

459

Publications

29.3K

Citations

752

Authors

436

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

57

Authors

752

  1. RV
    Rajiv Vohra

    Brown University, United States

    9 publications · 1.4K citations

    9

    h-index

  2. MF
    Michael Finus

    FernUniversität in Hagen, Germany

    9 publications · 491 citations

    9

    h-index

  3. DR
    Debraj Ray

    New York University, United States

    8 publications · 1.4K citations

    8

    h-index

  4. MW
    Myrna Wooders

    Vanderbilt University, United States

    7 publications · 321 citations

    7

    h-index

  5. SW
    Shlomo Weber

    Southern Methodist University, United States

    5 publications · 156 citations

    5

    h-index

1–5 of 752

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    25 publications · 3.1K citations

    19

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 18 publications · 2.6K citations

    16

    h-index

  3. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 25 publications · 739 citations

    16

    h-index

  4. Econometrica

    17 publications · 2.7K citations

    16

    h-index

  5. International Journal of Game Theory

    18 publications · 1.7K citations

    14

    h-index

1–5