The Journal of Finance · 1992 · 255 citations · 28 references
BusinessEconomicsInsuranceContract TheoryFinancial EconomicsInsurance EconomicsAdverse SelectionDeposit InsuranceIncentive SchemesInsurance IntermediationInsurance PolicyRisk AversionDeposit Insurance AnalysisIncentive-compatible ContractsInsurance IncentiveMoral Hazard AnalysisPrivate Information RevelationRisk-based Deposit Insurance
ABSTRACT We analyze risk‐sensitive, incentive‐compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard. Without deposit‐linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk‐sensitive, incentive‐compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive, deregulated environment, except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy. We establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital; the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well. This suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced, risk‐sensitive deposit insurance.
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Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Douglas W. Diamond, Philip H. Dybvig · Journal of Political Economy · 1983 · 9.4K citations · Full text
Roger B. Myerson · Mathematics of Operations Research · 1981 · 6.1K citations
Eugene F. Fama · Journal of Monetary Economics · 1985 · 2.4K citations
Business, Banking Law, Finance +10