RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2010 · 43 citations · 17 references
ManagementCorporate GovernanceFinancial ManagementAgency TheoryCorporate FinanceExecutive CompensationCapital MarketsCorporate Governance MechanismsFinancial CrisesFinancial OversightFinancial RiskRisk GovernanceCompensation Risk TakingCompensation Risk-taking IncentivesCorporate Governance In DistressCorporate Risk GovernanceExecutive Compensation EffectsFinancial Crises GovernanceRisk Management IncentivesRisk-taking Effects
This paper studies the extent to which risk-taking incentives of CEOs and other governance features in a range of years prior to the recent financial crisis were related to the write-downs of U.S. financial institutions during the crisis. We document that institutions whose CEOs had particularly strong risk-taking incentives, weak ownership incentives and independent boards had the highest write-downs, both in absolute terms and relative to total assets. Furthermore, financial institutions with lower Tier-1 ratios and those with CEOs who earned less than their colleagues at comparable firms had larger write-downs.
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Bank governance, regulation and risk taking
Luc Laeven, Ross Levine · 2008 · 3.1K citations
Law, Banking Law, Regulatory Policy +14
Corporate Governance and Risk‐Taking
Kose John, Lubomir P. Litov, Bernard Yeung · The Journal of Finance · 2008 · 1.7K citations