Transparent Belief

Transparent Belief is a philosophical construct within the theory of propositional attitudes denoting the epistemic stance whereby an agent’s belief is directly accessible to introspection without inferential mediation, thereby exhibiting epistemic transparency in the formation or justification of that belief.

8

Publications

422

Citations

10

Authors

10

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

4

Authors

10

  1. AB
    Alex Byrne

    Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States

    1 publications · 103 citations

    1

    h-index

  2. SK
    Sarah K. Paul

    University of Wisconsin–Madison, United States

    1 publications · 11 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. EM
    Eric Marcus

    Auburn University, United States

    1 publications · 35 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. JW
    Jennifer Way

    The University of Sydney, Australia

    1 publications · 17 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. MB
    Matthew Boyle

    Harvard University, United States

    1 publications · 117 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 10

Venues

  1. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

    2 publications · 220 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. Journal of Business Research

    JBR · 1 publications · 56 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. Analysis

    1 publications · 17 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. American Ethnologist

    AE · 1 publications · 37 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Synthese

    1 publications · 46 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5