A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash Equilibrium in which the strategy profile constitutes a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame of the original game, ensuring sequential rationality throughout all decision nodes.
390
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344
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2017–2026
55
Publications
390
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Ariel Rubinstein · Econometrica · 1982 · 5.4K citations
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
James W. Friedman · The Review of Economic Studies · 1971 · 1.8K citations
On strategy-proofness and single peakedness
Hervé Moulin · Public Choice · 1980 · 879 citations · Full text
1–5 of 390
Authors
645
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7
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5
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5
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1–5 of 645
Institutions
344
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
15 h-index
22 publications
1.7K citations
Maastricht University
Maastricht, The Netherlands
10 h-index
28 publications
670 citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
10 h-index
13 publications
655 citations
Tel Aviv University
Tel Aviv, Israel
9 h-index
14 publications
684 citations
Chinese University of Hong Kong
Hong Kong, Hong Kong
7 h-index
13 publications
585 citations
ETH Zurich
Zurich, Switzerland
7 h-index
8 publications
191 citations
New York University
New York, United States
7 h-index
9 publications
417 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
7 h-index
12 publications
492 citations
1–8 of 344
Venues
- Econometrica
23 publications · 8.5K citations
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- Journal of Economic Theory
JET · 20 publications · 1.7K citations
18
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- Games and Economic Behavior
26 publications · 2.8K citations
18
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- International Journal of Game Theory
18 publications · 3.8K citations
14
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- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
Repository · 10 publications · 202 citations
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