Intertemporal Incentive Compatibility
Intertemporal Incentive Compatibility is a solution concept in dynamic mechanism design that ensures agents' optimal strategies remain aligned with truth-telling across all periods and subgames, given their evolving private information and intertemporal dependencies in payoffs.
36
Publications
2.4K
Citations
65
Authors
58
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
6
Parents
36
Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations
Jacques Crémer · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1986 · 209 citations
The Allocation of Time in Decision-Making
Christopher F. Chabris, David Laibson, Carrie L. Morris et al. · Journal of the European Economic Association · 2009 · 99 citations · Full text
1–5 of 36
65
3
h-index
3
h-index
3
h-index
2
h-index
2
h-index
1–5 of 65
58
University of California, Davis
Davis, United States
3 h-index
6 publications
885 citations

Peking University
Beijing, China
3 h-index
5 publications
870 citations

National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
3 h-index
5 publications
355 citations
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Shanghai, China
3 h-index
5 publications
870 citations
University of Houston
Houston, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
45 citations
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Washington D.C., United States
2 h-index
2 publications
35 citations

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
217 citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
67 citations
1–8 of 58
Repository · 2 publications · 32 citations
2
h-index
2 publications · 81 citations
2
h-index
2 publications · 92 citations
2
h-index
1 publications · 66 citations
1
h-index
EAR · 1 publications · 39 citations
1
h-index
1–5