Intertemporal Incentive Compatibility

Intertemporal Incentive Compatibility is a solution concept in dynamic mechanism design that ensures agents' optimal strategies remain aligned with truth-telling across all periods and subgames, given their evolving private information and intertemporal dependencies in payoffs.

36

Publications

2.4K

Citations

65

Authors

58

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

6

Authors

65

  1. RC
    Robert C. Feenstra

    University of California, Davis, United States

    3 publications · 688 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. MY
    Miaojie Yu

    Peking University, China

    3 publications · 688 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. JG
    Jonathan Glover

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    3 publications · 84 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. ZL
    Zhiyuan Li

    University of California, Davis, United States

    2 publications · 597 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. DC
    David C. Mills

    Federal Reserve Board of Governors, United States

    2 publications · 35 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 65

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 2 publications · 32 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. Games and Economic Behavior

    2 publications · 81 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. International Economic Review

    2 publications · 92 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Journal of Applied Logic

    1 publications · 66 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. European Accounting Review

    EAR · 1 publications · 39 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5