Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium is a refinement of subgame perfect equilibrium in repeated games that restricts attention to equilibrium outcomes which cannot be jointly improved upon by credible renegotiation at any stage of the game.
70
Publications
8.3K
Citations
102
Authors
67
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
3
Publications
70
Renegotiation in repeated games
Joseph Farrell, Eric Maskin · Games and Economic Behavior · 1989 · 621 citations
Implementation and Renegotiation
Eric Maskin, John Moore · The Review of Economic Studies · 1999 · 267 citations
Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets With Costly State Verification
Robert M. Townsend · 1979 · 248 citations · Full text
Business, Contract Law, Economics +16
1–5 of 70
Authors
102
- EM
6
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- DS
3
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- BS
3
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- JF
2
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- AL
2
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1–5 of 102
Institutions
67
National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
4 h-index
5 publications
78 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
4 h-index
5 publications
329 citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
719 citations
New York University
New York, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
268 citations
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
693 citations
Tel Aviv University
Tel Aviv, Israel
2 h-index
2 publications
83 citations
London School of Economics and Political Science
London, United Kingdom
2 h-index
2 publications
279 citations
University of Washington
Seattle, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
128 citations
1–8 of 67
Venues
- SSRN Electronic Journal
Repository · 9 publications · 217 citations
9
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- Journal of Economic Theory
JET · 6 publications · 3.4K citations
6
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- Games and Economic Behavior
5 publications · 707 citations
5
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- Econometrica
5 publications · 1.1K citations
5
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- The RAND Journal of Economics
4 publications · 184 citations
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1–5