Strategic Substitutability

Strategic Substitutability is a strategic interaction property in game theory where the optimal action of one firm inversely responds to changes in the rival's strategy, such that increased aggressiveness by a competitor induces a firm to reduce its own strategic variable, typically observed in oligopolistic markets with downward-sloping reaction functions.

73

Publications

5.4K

Citations

132

Authors

116

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

11

Authors

132

  1. EF
    Ernst Fehr

    University of Zurich, Switzerland

    5 publications · 492 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. JT
    Jean‐Robert Tyran

    University of Copenhagen, Denmark

    5 publications · 492 citations

    5

    h-index

  3. XV
    Xavier Vives

    IESE Business School, Spain

    4 publications · 225 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. JS
    Joshua S. Gans

    University of Toronto, Canada

    3 publications · 444 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. SS
    Scott Stern

    Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States

    3 publications · 444 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 132

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 8 publications · 343 citations

    8

    h-index

  2. The Economic Journal

    3 publications · 177 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. Southern Economic Journal

    3 publications · 404 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 3 publications · 40 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Management Science

    3 publications · 289 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5