Strategic Entry Deterrence
Strategic Entry Deterrence is a theory in industrial organization that explains how incumbent firms employ preemptive actions, such as capacity expansion or pricing strategies, to credibly signal costly responses to potential entrants, thereby deterring market entry and preserving market power.
270
Publications
22.6K
Citations
407
Authors
242
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
26
Variants
Entry Deterrence
270
Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Paul Milgrom, John Roberts · Journal of Economic Theory · 1982 · 1.9K citations
Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing
A. Michael Spence · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1977 · 1.2K citations
A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers
Avinash Dixit · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1979 · 957 citations
1–5 of 270
407
6
h-index
4
h-index
4
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4
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States
3 publications · 1.3K citations
3
h-index
1–5 of 407
242

Tilburg University
Tilburg, The Netherlands
9 h-index
9 publications
207 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
9 h-index
9 publications
948 citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
9 h-index
9 publications
1K citations

Cornell University
Ithaca, United States
6 h-index
6 publications
359 citations
University of Colorado Boulder
Boulder, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
178 citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
2.4K citations
Michigan State University
East Lansing, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
276 citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
226 citations
1–8 of 242
19 publications · 1.2K citations
17
h-index
16 publications · 618 citations
13
h-index
Repository · 14 publications · 354 citations
12
h-index
9 publications · 724 citations
9
h-index
7 publications · 437 citations
7
h-index
1–5