Strategic Entry Deterrence

Strategic Entry Deterrence is a theory in industrial organization that explains how incumbent firms employ preemptive actions, such as capacity expansion or pricing strategies, to credibly signal costly responses to potential entrants, thereby deterring market entry and preserving market power.

270

Publications

22.6K

Citations

407

Authors

242

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

26

Variants

Entry Deterrence

Authors

407

  1. PM
    Peter M. Kort

    Tilburg University, Netherlands

    6 publications · 150 citations

    6

    h-index

  2. TS
    Thomas S. Robertson

    University of Pennsylvania, United States

    4 publications · 319 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. KH
    Kuno Huisman

    Tilburg University, Netherlands

    4 publications · 112 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. JA
    J. Anthony Cookson

    University of Colorado Boulder, United States

    4 publications · 178 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. RS
    Richard Schmalensee

    Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States

    3 publications · 1.3K citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 407

Venues

  1. The RAND Journal of Economics

    19 publications · 1.2K citations

    17

    h-index

  2. International Journal of Industrial Organization

    16 publications · 618 citations

    13

    h-index

  3. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 14 publications · 354 citations

    12

    h-index

  4. Journal of Industrial Economics

    9 publications · 724 citations

    9

    h-index

  5. Management Science

    7 publications · 437 citations

    7

    h-index

1–5