Sequential Combinatorial Auctions

Sequential Combinatorial Auctions is a type of combinatorial auction mechanism in which items are allocated through a series of successive rounds, each allowing bidders to express bids on bundles of items, thereby enabling price discovery and strategic adaptation over time.

16

Publications

959

Citations

43

Authors

27

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

3

Authors

43

  1. BL
    Brendan Lucier

    Microsoft (United States), United States

    2 publications · 201 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. MF
    Michal Feldman

    Tel Aviv University, Israel

    2 publications · 201 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. CA
    Craig A. Tovey

    Georgia Institute of Technology, United States

    2 publications · 177 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. SK
    Sven Koenig

    University of Southern California, United States

    2 publications · 177 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. NG
    Nick Gravin

    Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

    2 publications · 201 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 43

Venues

  1. Journal of Economic Surveys

    1 publications · 51 citations

    1

    h-index

  2. Artificial Intelligence

    1 publications · 30 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. Robotics and Autonomous Systems

    1 publications · 42 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. arXiv (Cornell University)

    Repository · 1 publications · 48 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. MIS Quarterly

    1 publications · 34 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5