Sequential Combinatorial Auctions
Sequential Combinatorial Auctions is a type of combinatorial auction mechanism in which items are allocated through a series of successive rounds, each allowing bidders to express bids on bundles of items, thereby enabling price discovery and strategic adaptation over time.
16
Publications
959
Citations
43
Authors
27
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
3
Parents
16
Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier · 2015 · 123 citations
Business, Economics, Auction Theory +12
The power of sequential single-item auctions for agent coordination
Sven Koenig, Craig A. Tovey, Michail G. Lagoudakis et al. · 2006 · 120 citations
Issues in Computational Vickrey Auctions
Tüomas Sandholm · International Journal of Electronic Commerce · 2000 · 119 citations
Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier · 2014 · 78 citations · Full text
Business, Economics, Auction Theory +12
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27

Tel Aviv University
Tel Aviv, Israel
2 h-index
2 publications
201 citations
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, United States
2 h-index
4 publications
417 citations

University of Auckland
Auckland, New Zealand
2 h-index
2 publications
73 citations
North Carolina State University
Raleigh, United States
2 h-index
4 publications
68 citations
Microsoft (United States)
Redmond, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
366 citations
Microsoft Research (United Kingdom)
Cambridge, United Kingdom
1 h-index
2 publications
156 citations

The University of Adelaide
Adelaide, Australia
1 h-index
3 publications
126 citations
University of Kansas
Lawrence, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
34 citations
1–8 of 27
1 publications · 51 citations
1
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1 publications · 30 citations
1
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1 publications · 42 citations
1
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Repository · 1 publications · 48 citations
1
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1 publications · 34 citations
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