Self-selection Mechanisms

Self-Selection Mechanisms is a theoretical framework in insurance contract design that enables individuals to sort themselves into different pricing or coverage categories based on their private information, thereby allowing firms to practice indirect price discrimination while maintaining incentive compatibility.

314

Publications

22.5K

Citations

717

Authors

360

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

54

Authors

717

  1. CR
    Chandra R. Bhat

    The University of Texas at Austin, United States

    3 publications · 172 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. BY
    Bee Yan Aw

    Pennsylvania State University, United States

    3 publications · 232 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. SC
    Sukkyun Chung

    University of the Arts, United States

    3 publications · 232 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. RB
    Robin Boadway

    Queen's University, Canada

    3 publications · 415 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. XC
    Xinyu Cao

    University of Minnesota, United States

    3 publications · 799 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 717

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 19 publications · 666 citations

    13

    h-index

  2. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 9 publications · 227 citations

    9

    h-index

  3. The Review of Economics and Statistics

    5 publications · 825 citations

    5

    h-index

  4. American Economic Review

    5 publications · 1.2K citations

    5

    h-index

  5. Applied Economics

    4 publications · 111 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5