The Rubinstein Bargaining Model is a game-theoretic model of sequential bargaining in which two players alternately make offers to divide a surplus over an infinite time horizon, with the distinguishing feature that delayed agreements result in discounted payoffs, leading to a unique subgame perfect equilibrium determined by the players' relative patience.
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Rubinstein BargainingRubinstein Model
Publications
38
Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Rey · Econometrica · 1994 · 558 citations
Dilip Abreu, Faruk Gül · Econometrica · 2000 · 360 citations
Vijay Krishna, Roberto Serrano · The Review of Economic Studies · 1996 · 193 citations · Full text
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University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, United States
2 h-index
5 publications
148 citations
Pennsylvania State University
State College, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
229 citations
Indian Statistical Institute
Kolkata, India
2 h-index
5 publications
128 citations
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
4 publications
233 citations
University of Tehran
Tehran, Iran
2 h-index
3 publications
104 citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
2 h-index
5 publications
135 citations
National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
6 publications
597 citations
Western University
London, Canada
1 h-index
2 publications
234 citations
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- Econometrica
4 publications · 1.1K citations
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- Games and Economic Behavior
3 publications · 84 citations
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- The Review of Economic Studies
2 publications · 249 citations
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- Economic Theory
1 publications · 71 citations
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- Sustainability
1 publications · 25 citations
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