Robust Auction Design

Robust Auction Design is a methodology in auction theory that ensures optimal or near-optimal performance across a wide range of uncertainty conditions and bidder behaviors, without reliance on precise distributional assumptions.

32

Publications

1.5K

Citations

77

Authors

49

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

15

Authors

77

  1. DB
    Dirk Bergemann

    Yale University, United States

    3 publications · 59 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. BM
    Behnam Mohammadi‐Ivatloo

    University of Tabriz, Iran

    2 publications · 163 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. RM
    R. Mark Isaac

    University of Arizona, United States

    2 publications · 85 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. SM
    Stephen Morris

    University of Utah, United States

    2 publications · 47 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. DJ
    Duncan James

    Fordham University, United States

    2 publications · 85 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 77

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    3 publications · 235 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. Electric Power Systems Research

    3 publications · 190 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. Experimental Economics

    2 publications · 85 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Econometrica

    2 publications · 126 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

    Conference · 1 publications · 10 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5